. This indicates region building ambitions by the EU that are at odds with its otherwise internally motivated external migration policy which aims largely at exerting stronger control over migratory movements in non-member states. The EU's wish to regulate migration beyond its territory means that it tries to shape the complex set of borders of inclusion and exclusion to the state territory of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMC), to their communities of belonging and labour markets (Geddes, 2005) . These attempts therefore inevitably impact on any effort to create a denser web of relations in the Euro-Mediterranean area that is at the heart of region building at large.
POLICY CONVERGENCE?
There is little reason to expect either differentiation or policy convergence in the EU's engagement with SEMC in the area of migration policy. Two reasons lead to this expectation:
(a) the regulatory nature of EU external migration policy limits the scope for differentiation and (b) discrepancies between the EU and SEMC over the content of migration policy restrict policy convergence.
International migration is by definition a cross-border phenomenon. This poses challenges to states in their wish to regulate the international movement of people because they are limited to the boundaries of administrative and legal influence over their territory (Taylor, 1994) . States have tried to counter this obstacle by means of international cooperation in their attempts to exert 'remote control' of migratory movements beyond their territorial borders (Zolberg, 2005) . Although not a state in its own right, the EU also attempts to control migratory movements before they reach the outer Schengen border and depends on co-operation with SEMC. As a regulatory policy, migration policy mostly aims at fixing rules of admission and regulating access to state territory. The nature of these rules as not negotiable severely restricts the EU's scope to move away from its internally inspired policy objectives to filter 'wanted' from 'unwanted' migration or to build up asylum capacities that comply with international law. Consequently, the priority status of EU external migration policy and its strong normative content leave little room for policy differentiation in SEMC.
The EU aim to transfer its policy objectives abroad conflicts with SEMC interests with regard to their state sovereignty, relations with neighbouring countries in the region and internal political dynamics. EU external migration policy touches on sensitive areas of SEMC state sovereignty in particular with regard to border control and readmission because regulating access to its territory can be seen as the privilege of an independent state.
Readmission is hereby contentious because the EU does not only want non-member states to readmit irregular migrant nationals but also non-nationals to its southern neighbours that transited via their territories into the EU. The potential tightening of SEMC border controls as an outcome of EU co-operation can also provoke new tensions among the countries in the region. Such an outcome would sit uncomfortably with the idea of region building in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, SEMC are often countries of origin for EU immigration and profit from the yearly inflow of remittances. Restricting the movement of their citizens is therefore unpopular with their local populations, affects their socio-economic conditions and can cause unfavourable changes to the political climate for the regimes in power (Brand, 2006) . Given that SEMC (in contrast to EU accession countries) are under no legal obligation to accept and implement EU policies, the possibilities of policy convergence should be slim despite a power imbalance in favour of the Union in its overall relations with SEMC.
The more surprising is the finding that some EU co-operation with SEMC is taking place in the area of migration policy. The external governance literature points out the importance of 'externalities of European integration' which can increase the possibility of policy convergence (Lavenex 2008 , Lavenex & Uçarer, 2002 . SEMC are increasingly affected by EU externalities. EU measures to tighten its border controls hinder irregular migrants in transit to the EU to enter its territory. If increasing numbers of immigrants are seen in an unfavourable light in SEMC, then these negative externalities of EU integration can stimulate SEMC governments to control their borders more vigilantly and engage with EU co-operation in this area. In consequence, local actors can adopt ownership over restrictive EU policy initiatives and even drive policy convergence.
Despite SEMC inclinations to bring their policies in line with restrictive EU policies as a result of negative externalities, this article highlights three factors that impinge on the EU's ability to pursue its objectives in an undifferentiated way: (1) relations between individual member states and SEMC; (2) intra-EU co-ordination problems and (3) the effect of organisational environments in SEMC on implementation of EU external migration policy.
(1) EU relations with neighbouring countries can have repercussions on EU governance, a process named 'internalisation' by some (Friis & Murphy, 1999: 213) .
The aim to restrict the movement to the Schengen area is driven by member states' concerns about security issues and access to their labour markets and welfare systems.
Individual member states may be therefore more pressed to obtain some degree of cooperation with non-member states (leading to differentiated arrangements) than to follow EU migration policy as a rigid and undifferentiated framework. In particular those member states with an EU outer border are put under pressure by EU legislation to restrict entry to their territories because the first country of entry is in charge of processing asylum applications in case of an irregular border crossing (Council of the European Union, 2003: art. 10 ). This increases the role of member states over the role of EU actors. For example, some SEMC have had continuing success to frustrate Community readmission agreements which undermined the Commission's position vis-à-vis the member states. Despite a decade of negotiations, the Commission was unable to conclude such agreements with Morocco (since 2000), Turkey and Algeria (both since 2002). In their pursuit to readmit irregular migrants, the member states have resorted to sign informalized agreements with non-member states (albeit more limited in scope than Community readmission agreements) (Cassarino, 2007) . This practice violates the Commission's exclusive Council mandate and weakens its standing for future mandates and in driving EU external migration policy.
ii EU actors may therefore opt to take non-member states' interests stronger into account and accommodate their policy approaches in order to achieve co-operation. Limited policy convergence would have the price of geographical, sectoral and potentially normative differentiation.
(2) If the EU wants to keep differentiation low, then internal co-ordination between Commission Directorate Generals (DGs) is crucial for providing external incentives within and across policy sectors. External incentives can tempt SEMC to adopt policy objectives and set them into practice without allowing too many concessions to particular SEMC that move away from its original policy intentions. As the driving actor of external migration policy, DG Freedom, Security and Justice (JLS) has triggered tensions with classical external EU actors such as DG Development and DG External Relations (RELEX) who felt that their agendas were affected by the internally motivated policy objectives of this cross-cutting policy issue (Boswell, 2008: 499-508). Organisational environments at EU level therefore can limit possibilities for policy convergence.
(3) If organisational environments can influence the likelihood of EU co-operation on migration policy, then the organisational environments in SEMC are also likely to shape EU external migration policy and contribute to dynamics of differentiationespecially during the implementation phase. Indeed, the EU already struggles to enforce regulations in its own member states (Dimitrakopoulos & Richardson, 2001; Knill, 2006) . The EU depends particularly on non-member state agencies to drive implementation of EU external migration policy. Implementation in non-member states should not be seen as a non-political process following a hierarchical "implementation chain" that translates EU policy objectives into action but as a process of continued bargaining over policy output in what has been termed a 'policy-action relationship' (Barrett & Fudge, 1981) . Since the EU is not engaging with a primordial soup but with an established organisational context, domestic political structures and administrative capabilities in SEMC are crucial factors that mediate EU influence as flagged in the EU external governance literature (Lavenex, 2008 : 948, Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009 (Bardach, 1977: 85) . Furthermore, adequate resources and trained personnel need to be available as well as agreement over the purpose and logic of EU interventions as identified in the implementation literature (for an overview see Hill & Hupe, 2002) . If the migration policy field is underdeveloped in SEMC, EU projects often attempt to build up new organisations, restructure responsibilities and finance training and equipment. EU projects therefore provide opportunity structures to SEMC actors which can provoke "turf wars" about responsibilities and policy influence among implementing organisations. These dynamics can contribute to differentiation because EU actors are dependent on local implementing organisations in order to set policy into practice and struggle to control the policy output of such co-operation. It is therefore crucial to understand the organisational context with which the EU is engaging in order to assess the potential for differentiation and policy convergence in different SEMC.
These considerations set the scene for the investigation of differentiation and convergence processes between EU and SEMC migration policies. The EU attempts to transfer its policy objectives abroad with little scope for differentiation. At the same time, these objectives largely conflict with SEMC interests in the area of migration which leave little room for policy convergence. Nevertheless, SEMC are possibly inclined to restrict the movement of people into their own territories and hereby conform to EU objectives in order to respond to externalities of tightened EU border controls. Even so, the EU has to struggle to stop differentiation from eroding the transfer of its external migration policy into SEMC because: (1) Member states may be more interested in achieving their own migration policy objectives than in an undifferentiated EU arrangement which makes both member states and Commission more open to consider SEMC interests to achieve some kind of co-operation; (2) EU internal co-ordination problems reduce EU leverage towards SEMC; (3) policy changes can occur during the implementation process that are difficult to control for the EU. Do we see policy convergence and differentiation against long odds in this setting? What are the implications for EU policy outcome and the prospects for region building? This article starts the analysis by assessing EU migration policy objectives to the region before turning to EU co-operation with Morocco as an exploratory case.
EXTERNAL MIGRATION POLICY OBJECTIVES: NO SPACE FOR DIFFERENTIATION?
In order to be able to assess the scope and nature of differentiation of EU migration policy towards SEMC and its role for region building, a close look at EU policy objectives is necessary. This section shows that the overall aim of the EU is to enforce stronger control measures and to reduce migratory pressure on EU borders. The EU applies this objective indiscriminately to SEMC. Where geographical differentiation takes place, this is the result of different co-operation stages between the EU and individual SEMC rather than a move away from its intransigent policy content. New policy items were added to the list of EU policy objectives which contributed to limited policy convergence thanks to the influence of subregional groups and bilateral relations between individual member states and SEMC.
The 1999 , 2004: 20-23 and 2009: 72f, 76) . The focus of EU external migration policy has been widely criticized as subjugating non-Member States to EU interests, primarily in border controls, readmission and shifting asylum pressures outside of EU territory (Lavenex, 1999; Lindstrøm, 2005; Taylor, 2005) .
What is the scope for policy differentiation in SEMC given the wide range of objectives from security concerns, via humanitarian considerations to the "root causes" approach? A look into the multi-annual national action plans which are agreed between the EU and the respective non-member state shows the specific aims of the EU in SEMC (Table   1 ). The action plans are therefore meant to adapt broader EU policy objectives to the local context. The EU makes subsequently funding available to transpose these objectives into action by means of concrete initiatives in SEMC. Table 1 gives an overview of policy objectives towards SEMC in subfields of external migration policy. The dominant EU approaches are restrictive policy and control measures, capacity-building and alignment to international conventions with tentative co-operation on the side regarding legal migration and the 'migration-development nexus' (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2002) . Given the fact that migration policy is by and large a regulatory policy, EU migration control objectives offer little space to take account of the diversity of migrant realities in different SEMC.
Although national action plans are based on mutual agreement with SEMC governments, they show no significant move away from the EU's main aims. What appears to be differentiation in the case of individual action plans to accommodate to SEMC' interests is the result of co-operation stages. These co-operation stages therefore reflect that the EU embraces differentiated integration which allows for geographical and sectoral but not Libya to southern Italy and Malta (Hamood, 2008) . Such co-operation is, however, not without a price and allowed Libya to access sophisticated military technology to police its borders. iv In other cases, bilateral relations and sub-regional fora between SEMC and privileged interlocutor member states allowed for (limited) influence of non-member states on 9 policy developments at EU level. Although EU initiatives on admission policy (for example circular migration schemes) and on "migration and development" are a recent and underdeveloped component of EU external migration policy, they are the product of such influence and provide evidence of two-sided policy convergence. n/a n/a n/a n/a Egypt n/a *promote co- PA n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Frontex Syria n/a n/a n/a n/a *consider direct co-operation to better refugee's living conditions n/a n/a , 2004a; 2004c; 2004d; 2005c; 2006c; 2006d; 2006e; 2006f; n.d.-a; n.d.-b; Libya & EU, 2006; Interview DG RELEX. EU external migration policy stated clearly from the beginning the aim to reduce migratory movements into member states (Council of the European Union, 1992: annex 5).
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Although the Council Tampere Conclusions (1999b: 3) propagated a 'comprehensive approach to migration' to achieve 'co-development' in the EU and its partner countries, the first action plans were seen as unbalanced by the target countries. Morocco demanded for example more emphasis on socio-economic aspects rather than security approaches to migration (Council of the European Union, 2000: 7) . Around the early 2000s, the link between migration and development became a fashionable topic for international organisations (Lavenex, 2008: 441f (Boswell, 2008: 502) . viii It has been argued that these new initiatives have impacted little on the prevailing security oriented EU policy frame and that more fundamental re-steering is needed (Lavenex & Kunz, 2008: 453f; Pastore, 2007: 56-62 
IMPLEMENTING EU MIGRATION INITIATIVES IN MOROCCO: AN OPEN DOOR FOR DIFFERENTIATION
Implementation research helps to carry the analysis beyond the level of EU policy intentions.
It can provide answers to core questions pointed up in the introduction to this volume such as who brought about differentiation and convergence as well as why. Answers to these questions help to characterise the region building model that fits best for co-operation in the area of migration policy. Examples from implementation of EU policy in Morocco reveal the importance of bilateral relations between individual member and non-member states, the externalities of European integration, EU internal co-ordination problems and domestic political structures. These factors provide an open door for differentiation and provide an example of a rather unexpected à la carte co-operation. While limited policy convergence is taking place, it is not a one-sided process of SEMC aligning with EU policy objectives but shows mutual concessions during the translation of policy objectives into "action".
Spanish-Moroccan relations and EU migration policy
The Spanish-Moroccan case illustrates how bilateral relations between individual member and non-member states can hinder or facilitate EU co-operation and ultimately policy convergence (as seen with the EU 'Global Approach to Migration'). In response to Moroccan irregular immigration during the 1990s, the conservative Spanish government under Aznar Therefore, relations between a member and a non-member state shape policy convergence by exacerbating the potential for success or frustration of EU interventions and by channelling in non-member states' interests onto the EU agenda.
Domestic political structures
The structure of political systems in SEMC puts central actors in gatekeeper positions of EU interventions. Overcoming their vetoes by accommodating their interests means to contribute to EU policy differentiation. In the case of Morocco, the King holds most political power (McFaul & Cofman Wittes, 2008) and his "royal instructions" (such as those initiating Spanish-Moroccan border control co-operation) are crucial for EU interventions to go ahead.
In addition, the Moroccan Interior Ministry is the opaque centre of power of the political system with close links into the Palace and has dominated the country through administrative authority, clientelism and nepotism (Vermeren, 2006: 80; Maghraoui, 2001: 14) .
Corresponding to its role as the monarchy's control body, the Interior Ministry also dominates
Moroccan migration policy where it is in charge of border controls, the fight against human trafficking and illegal immigration (Elmadmad, 2007: 7) . Its vision of migration and asylum has been described as securitized and is incoherent with that of other ministries focusing on the migration-development nexus and labour migration (such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Employment). xiii The King and Interior Ministry hence occupy central gatekeeper positions at the apex of political power in Morocco. EU co-operation on border management in Morocco illustrates this point and reveals that EU concessions to the Interior Ministry had distorting influence on seemingly intransigent EU migration policy objectives.
EU-Moroccan co-operation on border controls
Looking at EU-border management interventions is of particular interest because they aim at influencing central and exclusive activities of sovereign states. In such a setting, it might be possible to overcome the opposition from central gatekeepers through normative and sectoral differentiation. In consequence, EU-project conditions followed Morocco's ideas and interests and reinforced the Interior Ministry's position as the central actor of EU migration policy.
The EU had to compromise part of its objectives and increase funding to achieve co-operation.
Bilateral border control co-operation is strongly influenced by EU incentives but also shows how the Interior Ministry adopted repressive EU policy responses to a changing and apparently daunting migration environment that is a consequence of border reinforcement along the outer EU border. Ultimately, the effects of reinforced border controls in Morocco undermined other EU policy objectives and were detrimental for migrants' human rights. perspective on migration issues in order to achieve co-operation. Although the EU intervention's general focus on migration control was maintained, Moroccan actors engaged with the EU agenda largely following their own conditions to respond to externalities of European integration that turn transit migration into immigration to Morocco. Meeting stern opposition, EU actors were quick to concede in order to achieve co-operation at all.
Centralized political structures with capable and resourceful gatekeepers can therefore contribute to sectoral and normative differentiation of EU policy output.
Towards policy convergence?
The Moroccan migration policy agenda has since been dominated by largely repressive measures (international co-operation in border management and repatriation of irregular migrants) juxtaposed with a national development programme (Sghir, 2006) . Morocco has in effect become the Gendarme of Europe that it never wanted to be largely out of fear of increased sub-Saharan immigration. The Head of the Directorate for Migration and Border
Surveillance stated consequently that the European externalisation of border management was 'not an illogical approach, but quite simply, we must be given the financial and logistic resources to fulfil our ambitions' (Sghir, 2006: 2, author's emphasis 
EU internal structures
EU internal co-ordination problems can contribute to differentiated EU policy in SEMC.
While the role of domestic gatekeepers seems a likely source of policy differentiation, the role of EU internal processes may seem less so given that the EU is an ambitious international actor which attributes priority status to its external migration policy. However, Commission
DGs are concerned with their own portfolios and want to protect them where they conflict with the internally motivated EU external migration agenda. The result is EU internal coordination problems which undermine EU ambitions of policy convergence as will be exemplified regarding asylum policy and the Community readmission agreement with Morocco.
Where EU external migration policy is drawing from law backed by international organisations (such as the 1951 Geneva Convention and its guardian, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), the EU uses co-operation with international organisations. However, EU internal co-ordination problems undermined rule transfer and long-term policy convergence. UNHCR has had a troublesome relationship with the 
CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS DIFFERENTIATION AND POLICY CONVERGENCE
The EU has clearly set objectives in its external migration policy towards SEMC. Restrictive control measures are at its centre, aiming at reducing irregular migration as well as allowing readmission of nationals and TCNs. These objectives should allow for little differentiation.
Despite the EU aim of policy transfer, limited two-sided policy convergence has been the outcome of co-operation due to the contested nature of policy objectives and EU dependence on national implementers in partner countries. At the level of policy objectives, sub-regional dialogue and relations between individual member states with SEMC have introduced new policy approaches to the EU agenda. However, these have materialized into limited policy output with the effect of sectoral and normative differentiation. Therefore, EU policy retained its focus on repressive measures mainly due to member states' reluctance to concede on admission policies and due to a lack of clarity of the migration-development nexus.
Implementing EU migration policy in Morocco may be indicative for the potential of differentiation and policy convergence with SEMC. Spanish-Moroccan relations exacerbated the potential for facilitating and frustrating EU initiatives in this contentious policy field.
Interdependence between both sides of the Mediterranean stimulates differentiation and limited policy convergence. The externalities of European integration in form of a changing migration reality in SEMC motivate local actors to adopt ownership in EU co-operation on border controls. Although policy convergence to EU policies can be observed, the EU needed to go a long way to achieve co-operation at times. Concessions to central political actors in SEMC were made and control loosened over policy interventions. This normative and sectoral differentiation can provoke adverse effects on policy convergence by undermining those parts of the EU external migration package that focus on human rights and international commitments such as the protection of refugees and asylum seekers.
Apart from central SEMC actors that function as gatekeepers of EU initiatives, EU internal processes also contribute to differentiation. Co-ordination issues in the European Commission limit EU leverage in negotiations with SEMC. In addition, DGs do not want to jeopardize their own portfolios because of non-co-operation on migration issues even though migration is considered an EU priority policy area. These processes can undermine conditionality, project follow-ups and long-term policy convergence.
Normative and sectoral differentiation processes were crucial for achieving cooperation between the EU and SEMC. While they contributed to limited policy convergence, region building efforts were affected in an unintended manner from an EU perspective. The ENP framework of national action plans allows functional considerations to drive EU engagement with SEMC in the area of migration policy corresponding with the model of differentiated integration. This move takes account of the co-operation stages of overall bilateral relations but leaves the overall normative framework of EU policy objectives apparently untouched. However, when looking further afield at implementation dynamics in SEMC, co-operation rather fits the label à la carte. Member-and non-member state relations, EU co-ordination problems and implementation in SEMC bring about far more differentiation dynamics than the EU would like and frustrate largely region building following a model of differentiated integration. À la carte co-operation becomes a last resort to achieve any bilateral co-operation at all on migration rather than a conscious framework of EU region building in SEMC.
